In a number of my articles, the “Blitzkrieg” is mentioned. However, the term Blitzkrieg was not an official military designation. The strategic handbook of the Wehrmacht did not contain a concept called Blitzkrieg. The term Blitzkrieg appeared only very sporadically in German military publications before 1939.
But the military method did exist. The military successes in Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium and France were based on a combination of:
- concentrated deployment of armoured divisions
- rapid breakthroughs
- motorized infantry
- close cooperation between ground troops and the air force
- command at a high tempo
- bypassing enemy positions
- deep penetration behind enemy lines
- encirclement and destruction of enemy armies
The Germans actually conducted highly mobile operations that achieved enormous speed and operational surprise.
The term Blitzkrieg was mainly popularized by the American and British press after the German successes in Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. The term was already being used in September 1939. After the fall of France, Blitzkrieg became synonymous with the German way of waging war.
Goebbels made grateful use of the term Blitzkrieg. It fitted very well with the image of the Wehrmacht as an almost invincible modern war machine. But he was not the originator. Hitler himself also never used the word Blitzkrieg.
The German victory in France was not the result of a pre-established strategic plan. Operational planning, experience, the initiative of commanders, incorrect assessments by the Allies and a considerable amount of luck were decisive.
The German operation was called Aufmarschanweisung Nr. 4 Fall Gelb, and the plan resembled the plan Germany had used in 1914. But that plan was changed several times. Especially after a German aircraft carrying part of the plans crashed, the plan was reconsidered.
Erich von Manstein considered the original plan a bad idea and came up with a different approach:
- attack Belgium and the Netherlands in the north
- the Allies would then send their best troops to Belgium
- the actual main German force would move through the Ardennes
- cross the Meuse at Sedan and move rapidly to the west
- in this way, cut off the British and French armies in Belgium from their supplies and from the rest of France
The French had calculated that the Germans would need nine to ten days to reach the Meuse through the Ardennes. The Germans had calculated, based on exercises, that they could do it in 60 hours. Heinz Guderian managed to complete the entire operation in 57 hours.
Once the German tanks had crossed the Meuse, something emerged that is today often referred to as Blitzkrieg:
- speed
- confusion
- disorganization
- even more speed
The German armoured divisions moved far too quickly for the French defences, and it essentially became a race. The German armoured commanders wanted to keep moving. No consolidation, no waiting for the infantry and no building of a new defensive line.
The Germans eventually reached the Channel coast, thereby cutting off the British Expeditionary Force, the Belgian army and a large part of the French army. This ultimately led to the evacuation at Dunkirk.
German success resulted from a combination of:
- the Manstein plan
- concentration of armoured forces
- strategic surprise
- good communications
- the initiative of individual commanders
- incorrect French assessments
- poor French command
- no adequate Allied strategic reserve
- a considerable amount of luck
The actual German strength in 1940 was considerably less “Blitzkrieg” than is generally believed. In 1941, during Operation Barbarossa, the attack on Russia, the same method of warfare was initially applied on a much larger scale. At first, this also succeeded spectacularly. But ultimately it came to a standstill because of failing logistics that could not keep up with the troops, the harsh weather conditions and the incredible resilience of the Russian army.