The term “Blitzkrieg” appears in several of my articles. However, Blitzkrieg was never an official military designation. The Wehrmacht’s strategic manuals contained no doctrine or concept formally known as Blitzkrieg. Before 1939, the term itself appeared only very sporadically in German military publications.
The military provisions of the treaty were not recognized by the German army in the 1920s and were already partially circumvented. Although the treaty banned Germany from owning tanks, there was experimentation with light, fast tanks. With Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein and Erwin Rommel, the idea grew to form Panzerdivisionen and later make the Blitzkrieg possible.
So a lot of studying had already been done. The German military successes in Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium and France were based on a combination of:
- the concentrated use of armored divisions
- rapid breakthroughs
- motorized infantry
- close cooperation between ground forces and the air force
- a high operational tempo
- bypassing enemy positions
- deep penetration behind enemy lines
- the encirclement and destruction of enemy armies
The Germans did in fact conduct highly mobile operations that achieved remarkable speed and a high degree of operational surprise.
The term Blitzkrieg was popularized primarily by the American and British press following the German victories in Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. The term was already being used in September 1939. After the fall of France, Blitzkrieg became synonymous with the German way of waging war.
Goebbels made extensive use of the term Blitzkrieg. It fitted perfectly with the image of the Wehrmacht as an almost invincible modern war machine. But he did not invent the term. Hitler himself never used the word Blitzkrieg either.
The German victory in France was not the result of a pre-existing strategic master plan. Operational planning, experience, the initiative of individual commanders, Allied miscalculations and a considerable amount of luck ultimately made the difference.
The German operation was known as Aufmarschanweisung Nr. 4 Fall Gelb, and the original plan resembled the plan Germany had used in 1914. However, the plan was changed several times. In particular, after a German aircraft carrying part of the operational plans crashed, the entire concept was reconsidered.
Erich von Manstein considered the original plan fundamentally flawed and proposed a different approach:
- attack Belgium and the Netherlands in the north
- the Allies would then send their best troops into Belgium
- the main German force would advance through the Ardennes
- cross the Meuse at Sedan and then drive rapidly westward
- thereby cut off the British, French and Belgian armies from their supplies and from the rest of France
The French had calculated that the Germans would need nine to ten days to cross the Ardennes and reach the Meuse. German exercises, however, had suggested that this could be accomplished in around 60 hours. Heinz Guderian managed to complete the entire operation in just 57 hours.
Once the German tanks had crossed the Meuse, something emerged that today is often associated with Blitzkrieg.
Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel drove their tanks westward as quickly as possible, even ignoring direct orders to halt. The German High Command was presented with a fait accompli and reluctantly began to accept that taking greater risks might in fact be justified.
The German armored divisions were moving far too quickly for the French defenses to cope with, and what essentially developed was a race toward the Channel coast. The German armored commanders wanted to keep moving. No consolidation, no waiting for the infantry and no construction of a new defensive line.
The Germans eventually reached the Channel coast, cutting off the British Expeditionary Force, the Belgian army and a large part of the French army. Hitler nevertheless ordered the armored units to wait for the infantry through his famous Haltbefehl. This pause ultimately contributed to the evacuation of the Allied forces from Dunkirk.
German success depended on the assumption that the enemy would collapse rapidly:
- the breakthrough was achieved along a narrow front, based on the assumption that the enemy would be unable to cut off the advancing forces
- large numbers of infantry were not committed to the initial breakthrough
- logistics were primarily focused on keeping the mechanized units supplied with fuel
- the advancing armored units did not concern themselves excessively with counterattacks; after all, the enemy was assumed to be in complete confusion
- commanders were given considerable freedom to take the initiative
- and there was a substantial element of luck
A genuine Blitzkrieg is an extremely risky undertaking. Everything depends on the enemy collapsing. If that does not happen and the enemy manages to repel the attacks, the advancing forces can find themselves hopelessly exposed and ultimately destroyed. The Germans therefore did not adopt Blitzkrieg as a general military doctrine.
What is important regarding the Blitzkrieg is that the Dutch armed forces were totally unprepared for a war with Germany. The troops were not trained, and the military equipment was actually still largely the same as that of the First World War. After all, the Netherlands was neutral and believed it could avoid German aggression.
The same applies to the attack on Russia. Stalin believed that the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact determined the relationship between Russia and Germany and did not expect German aggression. Here too, the Russian armed forces were not prepared for an attack by a well-oiled German war machine.
In almost all cases, therefore, the Germans encountered an opponent who was initially unable to offer resistance. For this reason, the Germans were able to achieve successes at an extremely rapid pace.
The actual German military strength in 1940 was considerably less “Blitzkrieg” than is often assumed. In 1941, during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, essentially the same style of warfare was initially employed on a much larger scale. At first, it was spectacularly successful. But eventually the advance ground to a halt because of failing logistics that could not keep pace with the troops, the brutal weather conditions and the extraordinary resilience of the Soviet army.
Source:
Wikipedia – Blitzkrieg